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Wheeler, Dr. Mike
Space
http://www.philosophy.stir.ac.uk/staff/m-wheeler/wheeler-page.php
http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=10532&ttype=2
I joined the Department as a Senior Lecturer
in 2004. In 2006 I was promoted to Reader. I was here previously
(1999 to 2000) as a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow. In between
I was a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University
of Dundee. From 1995 to 1999 I was a Junior Research Fellow
in Philosophy at Christ Church Oxford. In conjunction with
this post, I was a member of the Department of Experimental
Psychology and the McDonnell-Pew Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience
at the University of Oxford. My doctoral work was carried
out at the University of Sussex.
Research My primary research interests are
in philosophy of science (especially cognitive science, psychology,
biology, artificial intelligence and artificial life) and
philosophy of mind. I also work on Descartes, on Heidegger,
and on environmental philosophy. Although my style of argument
is firmly analytic, I am keen to explore philosophy at the
interface between the analytic and the continental traditions.
My doctoral work provided the springboard for a book (Reconstructing
the Cognitive World: the Next Step) which was published in
2005 by MIT. In this book I draw on sources as seemingly disparate
as Heidegger and AI-oriented robotics, in order to articulate
and defend a non-standard philosophical framework for cognitive
science. Interpreted within this framework, some recent empirical
work in cognitive science is revealed as going beyond the
recognisably Cartesian understanding of mind that still dominates
the field. Elsewhere, in recently published and forthcoming
papers, I have continued a long-term critical engagement with
representational explanation in cognitive science, taken a
fresh look at John Searle's Chinese Room argument, attempted
to clarify the conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology,
responded to Andy Clark's claim that language is a special
kind of externally located tool that extends the cognitive
capabilities of some biological minds, examined the received
biological view of genes as coding for phenotypic traits,
and argued that not only has biological science recently rediscovered
a supposedly discredited Aristotelian account of organismic
development, but that this rediscovery has important implications
for the way in which some environmental ethicists appeal to
biological facts to support their positions. As an adjunct
to my philosophical work, I was, for some time, involved in
a project in which artificial life simulation techniques were
used to investigate the evolution of honesty in animal communication
systems.
In 2005 I was the national co-ordinator
for a series of Arts and Humanities Research Council workshops
on the topic of The Interactive Mind.
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